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n the area of failed alternative develop-
ment (AD) projects, the Andean region
has its sorry share to contribute. The
constant peasant uprisings in the Boli-
vian Chapare and the social tensions rife
among cocalero peasants in the South of
Colombia are woeful indicators of such fail-
ure.
In January, TNI attended a conference in
Germany, hosted by the German govern-
ment and UNDCP. The purpose was to crit-
ically evaluate experiences in AD and draw
conclusions for its future. 
In 1961, the UN Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs prohibited planting crops having
no medical or scientific purpose, fixing a
period of 15 years –for opium– and 25 years
–for coca– as deadlines for their ultimate
extinction. Those targets were clearly not
met. In 1998, ignoring decades of lack of suc-
cess in addressing the issue of illicit crops, the
UN set the year 2008 as yet another dead-
line by which to eliminate coca and opium.
At the UN Special Session on drugs, AD was
identified as a key instrument to be used in
fulfilling this objective, as part of an integral
anti-drugs strategy. The strategy’s other com-
ponents were eradication and law enforce-
ment. Experience has demonstrated that the
simultaneous use of these means –common-
ly known as the ‘carrot and stick approach’–
is counterproductive. 
This issue of Drugs & Conflict is dedicated to
this central theme in international drug con-
trol policies. Supply reduction, one of AD’s
objectives, has proven a failure in the Andean
region. To what was this failure due? What
may be expected of AD programmes in the
future, given the accumulated experiences? 
In reference to eradication pacts and AD pro-
jects undertaken in the Putumayo (Colom-
bia), Ricardo Vargas points out that there is
no fair compensation between what is
expected of peasants: destroying the main
source of their livelihood, and what the state
offers them in exchange: non-viable projects
doomed to fail and the impending threat of
fumigation should deadlines not be met.
International anti-drugs policy forces the
Colombian government to measure its results
by the number of hectares eradicated, with-
out regard for the region’s specific develop-
ment conditions. 
State institutions in Colombia have no capac-
ity to operate effectively in the Putumayo.
Locked into a crisis combining US pressure
to intensify aerial spraying, a collapsed peace
process and guerrilla action against the eco-
nomic and services infrastructure, the cen-
tral government is not in a position to guar-
antee the adequate running of AD pro-
grammes. To add fuel to fire, there is now the
argument that finance for terrorism must be
combated. This further erodes the social and
economic rights of the peasants and down-
plays the impact of aerial spraying on health
and the environment. 
In spite of widespread recognition of the
failure of current ‘carrot and stick’ policies (a
mixture of AD and repression), a ‘zero
option’ mentality persists and deceit about
success still abounds. The final declaration
issued at the German policy conference is not
radical in this sense. It does, however, offer
some leaps forward in terms of fine tuning the
AD concept, based on a better understand-
ing of livelihood decision making processes,
the importance of regular evaluations and,
the acceptance of the reality that the com-
munities most affected have not been allowed
to participate sufficiently in their own devel-
opment process. The declaration also man-
ages to define somewhat more precisely the
troublesome balance between AD and
repressive law enforcement. It is worth not-
ing that the UNDCP participated actively in
the conference, displaying real willingness to
seriously exchange opinions on these issues.
This yields a modicum of optimism regarding
the possibility that international bodies can
learn to identify best practices and see the
need to separate these from the current
repressive policies, increasingly recognised as
more harmful than drugs themselves.
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lternative Development should nei-
ther be made conditional on prior
elimination of drug crop cultivation
nor should a reduction be enforced
until licit components of livelihood strategies have
been sufficiently strengthened.”
This is one of the recommendations of the
Feldafing Declaration, the outcome of a confer-
ence in January hosted by the German Ministry
for Economic Cooperation and Development
(BMZ) and organised by the German Agency
for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the Foun-
dation for International Development (DSE)
and the United Nations International Drug
Control Programme (UNDCP). The confer-
ence on The Role of Alternative Development in
Drug Control and Develop-
ment Cooperation provided
a unique opportunity for
100 international policy
officials and experts
–including TNI– to discuss
lessons from 25 years of
experience in this field and
draw conclusions for the
future of Alternative
Development (AD).
One of the main concerns in this policy debate
has been the problematic relationship between
developmental and repressive approaches to
illicit drug crop cultivation. GTZ, which took
the initiative for the conference, has a long his-
tory as the major donor for crop substitution
and AD programmes in Asia and Latin Amer-
ica. The accumulation of field experience has
led the agency to take a clear stand on the need
to completely separate AD from forced erad-
ication. The tension between GTZ’s develop-
mental approach and the increasingly repres-
sive eradication efforts in Bolivia and Colom-
bia has now brought the agency to the brink
of retreat. Growing frustration and despair
over the incompatibility of sustainable devel-
opment aims and rigidly applied drug control
objectives prompted GTZ to convene a glob-
al reflection on the future of AD. The clash of
concepts is symbolised by the physical destruc-
tion of GTZ-funded projects by aerial fumiga-
tion in Colombia and the militarization of pro-
ject areas in the Chapare region of Bolivia. 
The application of strict drug control condi-
tionality to AD interventions, and the result-
ing mix of AD, law enforcement and forced
eradication has de-legitimised the concept. In
practice, the mix has led to increased social
tensions –as is currently patently obvious in
Bolivia. One of the Feldafing recommenda-
tions therefore reads: “Alternative Development
programmes cannot solve all social problems on a
national level, but it should be stressed and
expressed more clearly that Alternative Develop-
ment should never lead to increased social conflicts.
When designing Alternative Development pro-
grammes their potential for crisis prevention, con-
flict management and peace keeping should be
taken into account.”
Also present at the conference was Ulrich
Künzel, one of the
GTZ experts working
on an AD project in the
Cauca department,
who was kidnapped by
the Colombian FARC
guerrillas in July last
year and finally released
in October. Warmly
welcoming him to the
event, GTZ Director
General Wolfgang Schmitt said in his opening
address: “This tragic event showed that it is impos-
sible to combine in one region, and at one point in
time, alternative development with eradication. It
must be made clear to everyone that alternative
development has nothing to do with fumigation or
eradication. I do not want to imply that the kid-
napping would not have taken place if there had
been no eradication, but I am convinced that the
security situation is only exacerbated when eradi-
cation measures take place parallel to alternative
development. [...] Project areas must be free of
forced measures (fumigation, eradication, military
intervention) against the target population. This is
the only possible basis for integrated and sustain-
able development.”
Carrot and Stick Strategies
In recent years, international drug policy dis-
course reveals an increasing acceptance of the
alleged need to integrate AD concepts into a
so-called comprehensive “three-pronged strate-
gy of eradication, interdiction and alternative devel-
T
N
I
ALTERN ATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND ERADIC ATION:  
T H E F A I L E D B A L A N C E I N T H E A N D E A N R E G I O N
"It must be made clear to
everyone that alternative
development has nothing
to do with fumigation or
eradication" 
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opment.” At the 1998 UN General Assembly
Special Session on drugs (UNGASS), the mar-
riage of eradication and AD was maintained
throughout the preparations and the final doc-
uments. The Political Declaration calls for
strong support for alternative development,
but also for an emphasis on “the need for erad-
ication programmes and law enforcement mea-
sures to counter illicit cultivation.” Moreover, it
welcomes a global approach to the elimination
of illicit crops and commits member states to
working closely with UNDCP “to develop strate-
gies with a view to eliminating or significantly
reducing the illicit cultivation of the coca bush, the
cannabis plant and the opium poppy by 2008.”
The Action Plan on International Cooperation on
Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative
Development approved by UNGASS is a typical
consensus document, constructed on the basis
of drafts from the European Union (under
German leadership), the United States and
UNDCP, with written inputs from Mexico and
Colombia. According to Dorothe Buddenberg,
the UNDCP Alternative Development expert
who moderated the negotiations: “Only two
countries insisted that the link between law enforce-
ment and alternative development should be elab-
orated in the drafting of the Action Plan. While I
expected other countries to voice opposition, the
principles outlined were not strongly contested.”
The final text stresses that AD alone is not
enough: “Balanced approaches are likely to result
in more efficient strategies and successful out-
comes” and “National drug crop reduction and
elimination strategies should include comprehen-
sive measures such as programmes in alternative
development, law enforcement and eradication.” 
The terms ‘balanced approach’ and ‘compre-
hensive measures’ are the euphemisms used for
what is commonly referred to as the ‘carrot
and stick’ approach. Ms. Buddenberg noted:
“The balanced approach, originally a term devel-
oped to denote a balance between supply and
demand reduction measures, has been used here
to denote a balance between repressive law
enforcement approaches and more liberal devel-
opment oriented approaches.”
The language of the Action Plan thus legitimis-
es the use of force to reduce coca and opium
poppy cultivation. It does, however, specify cri-
teria under which AD should be comple-
mented by forced eradication: “When there is
organised criminal involvement in illicit drug crop
cultivation” and “In areas where viable alternative
sources of income already exist.” The Action Plan
also includes a warning about possible incom-
patibility: “In areas where alternative development
programmes have not yet created viable alterna-
tive income opportunities, the application of forced
eradication might endanger the success of alter-
native development programmes.”
Ever since UNGASS, the language of policy
documents has been filled with phrases
describing AD as “one of the components with-
in the comprehensive framework of the global drug
control strategy,” and “in support of comprehen-
sive crop control strategies.” References are often
made to “a three-pronged strategy of eradication,
interdiction, and alternative development.” Among
the list of ‘ideal conditions’ for alternative devel-
opment appears the phrase “consistently applied
disincentives through law enforcement and eradi-
cation.” The assumption of compatibility
between AD and forced eradication is rarely
questioned and mixing developmental and
repressive instruments in the field is explicitly
promoted.
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The UNGASS Action Plan defines alternative
development as “a process to prevent and
eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants con-
taining narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub-
stances through specifically designed rural
development measures in the context of sus-
tained national economic growth and sus-
tainable development efforts in countries tak-
ing action against drugs, recognising the par-
ticular socio-cultural characteristics of the
target communities and groups, within the
framework of a comprehensive and perma-
nent solution to the problem of illicit drugs.”
Additionally it mentions the aim “to promote
lawful and sustainable socio-economic
options for these communities and popula-
tion groups that have resorted to illicit culti-
vation as their only viable means of obtain-
ing a livelihood, contributing in an integrat-
ed way to the eradication of poverty.” 
Alternative Development Definition
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Escalation in the Andes
National strategies for coca elimination com-
bining as required alternative development,
law enforcement and eradication were soon
ready for implementation in Bolivia and Colom-
bia. Within these ‘balanced and comprehensive’
drug control strategies, the function of AD was
largely reduced to what the Action Plan had
called its intention “to create a supportive envi-
ronment for the implementation of that strategy.”
The subtleties of the restrictive criteria men-
tioned in the Action Plan were left aside and
the warning thrown to the wind.
In 2002, President Banzer of Bolivia present-
ed the ambitious ‘With Dignity!’ plan which
aimed to ”come out of the coca-cocaine circuit in
the next five years.” Crop substitution efforts,
compensation schemes and AD in the Chapare
region had been underway since 1983 and
more than $180 million had been invested. This
had managed to considerably expand areas of
licit crops in the region, but without reducing
net coca production. Arguing that ‘they had
their chance’, Banzer decided to force a break-
through, commencing a large-scale eradica-
tion of all illegal coca in the Chapare region
using military force. 
The other master plan in the region, Plan
Colombia, aims to achieve a reduction of 50%
over six years, supported by the controversial
$1.3 billion –largely military– US aid package
of 2000. The international donor conferences
ignited a global controversy in which European
donors distanced themselves from the US-
inspired plan. The complete blurring of the line
between AD and eradication, and the overem-
phasis of the ‘stick’, made developmental
donors highly reluctant to invest in the plan’s
‘carrot’. Forced eradication went ahead as
planned anyway. Massive spraying with herbi-
cides started in December 2000 in Southern
Colombia, destroying many AD projects in
the process. USAID supports so-called ‘social
pacts’ and ‘voluntary’ eradication agreements
with communities in the Putumayo. The restric-
tive conditions of those pacts and the fact that
they were negotiated under threat of fumiga-
tions rolled back two decades of AD history.
The pacts merely serve to justify eradication
and are doomed to fail. 
The current picture for Bolivia and Colombia
looks very grim, with daily confrontations and
mounting social tensions. Without blunt US
interference and threat of decertification, nego-
tiated agreements with the cocaleros in the Cha-
pare could easily have been achieved, the terms
of the social pacts in Colombia would have
been more realistic, genuine AD programmes
could have flourished and aerial spraying would
no longer be taking place. The rest of the inter-
national community, however, also has to take
responsibility for the crisis. The holy marriage
between eradication and AD sealed at
UNGASS and in its endorsement of thinking
in terms of deadlines, UNDCP’s support for
the framework of Plan Dignity and Plan Colom-
bia and its initial involvement in the plans to
develop mycoherbicides for forced eradication,
the propagandistic trumpeting of so-called suc-
cess stories and the acquiescence to violent
eradication measures have all contributed to
the escalation of repression and social tension. 
The result is an almost complete breach of con-
fidence with communities, a compromised
UNDCP, blurred distinctions between devel-
opment and repression, the sacrifice of most
other AD goals for the sake of hopeless
hectare counting, and (understandable) donor
reluctance to continue with AD investments.
The crisis is most visible in Bolivia and Colom-
bia, but the risks of an escalation of eradica-
tion measures and de-legitimation of the AD
concept are very real elsewhere. The 2008
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deadline, the renewed ‘zero option’ illusion, the
conceptual blur and the supposed effectiveness
of the ‘balanced approach’ in Bolivia lead to
mounting pressure to
show results elsewhere.
Scenarios with a high risk
potential for escalation
are the current expan-
sion of coca cultivation in
Peru (after the abandon-
ment of fields caused by
the coca price crash in
the first half of the
1990s), the expected
resurgence of opium
poppy cultivation in
Afghanistan (after the
dramatic crash last year
under Taleban rule) and the attempts, just
underway, to address the extensive production
of opium in Burma –now the world’s largest
producer.
A Future for Alternative Development 
There is a pressing need to prevent these
developments damaging beyond repair the
basic concept of Alternative Development. To
accept AD as nothing more than a sop after
repression would mean sacrificing the concept
altogether. In spite of the many failures and the
structural deficiency in terms of community
empowerment, there are also good examples
that deserve a well-funded future. Several pro-
jects have contributed to poverty alleviation
and improved living conditions in the mostly
marginalized areas where illicit crops are con-
centrated. Furthermore, AD still plays an
important role as counterweight to indiscrim-
inately repressive approaches to illicit cultiva-
tion. It also offers communities an option to
consider in their negotiations with authorities.
Given the fact that most illicit crops are grown
in a political context of high social tension and
armed conflict, AD projects have great poten-
tial to contribute to conflict prevention and
peace building. Moreover, AD could play an
important role –as GTZ put it- as a ‘precursor
in the drugs debate’ by stressing the develop-
mental factors that have to be taken into
account in drug policy-making. 
To safeguard best practices and enhance a
constructive future role for AD in the inter-
national drug policy debate, AD has to be
unequivocally de-linked
from the current escala-
tion of repression against
illicit cultivation. A start-
ing point is to accept the
implications of one very
basic and undeniable fact.
No measurable impact
has been achieved either
regionally or globally
after several decades of
supply-side interven-
tions. AD projects, as
well as eradication oper-
ations and law enforce-
ment, have had an impact on the local and/or
national levels, usually resulting in displace-
ments and temporary disruptions. But on a
region-wide and global level, the demand-sup-
ply balance in the market has always re-estab-
lished itself. As the Inter-American Drug Abuse
Control Commission (OAS-CICAD) con-
cludes in its 2001 Statistical Summary on
Drugs: 
“The area under coca cultivation remained virtu-
ally constant, hovering around 200,000 hectares
for the last ten years. [...] Interdiction and eradi-
cation efforts in two of the countries with the most
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“The overall conclusion is
that notwithstanding
efforts to reduce crops in
producing countries and
cocaine seizures,
production and
availability of this drug
for consumption have not
been reduced”
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coca crops were successful at the national level, but
not at the regional level, since a reduction in crops
in some countries is offset by cultivation in new
areas of other countries. [...] The overall conclu-
sion is that notwithstanding efforts to reduce crops
in producing countries and cocaine seizures, pro-
duction and availability of this drug for consump-
tion have not been reduced.”
Non-Conditionality
If the international community could finally
recognize the narrowness of the margins for
policy intervention in
terms of global supply
reduction and accept
the fact that the phe-
nomenon of drug-
linked crop cultivation
is here to stay as long as
demand exists, coun-
tries and AD donors
could be relieved of the
pressure to comply
with reduction targets
and deadlines. In terms
of global drug control, it
really makes no differ-
ence at all whether
coca growers in the
Chapare are left with
their ‘k’ato’ (0.16 hectares) or agreement on
achieving a 50% reduction in five years is
reached with respect to the schemes in south-
ern Colombia that were originally proposed for
the social pacts. 
More realistic and flexible time frames allow-
ing for gradual reduction over a period of sev-
eral years and greater compatibility with local
rural development plans are essential. A ‘par-
ticipatory approach’ means more than just
consulting communities about their wishes. It
requires serious dialogues in which these com-
munities are allowed to have substantial leeway
for negotiation. Experiments with such 
gradual scenarios have been impossible in the
case of Bolivia and Colombia –in contrast to
the situation in, for example, Laos and Vietnam
where gradualism is an accepted principle of
AD strategy. 
Mutual trust should be constructed upon the
basis that, if development in the target period
cannot guarantee dignified conditions of life,
the continued presence of an established max-
imum of illicit crops per family for subsistence
purposes is allowed. This means, in fact, de-
linking AD from the conditionality embedded
in the ‘balanced approach’. Assistance has been
made far too conditional on hectare reduc-
tions, and the discourse that ‘if the carrot
does not work fast enough, we’ll show them
the stick’ has gained ground. In a sense, de-link-
ing AD from this ‘comprehensive policy frame-
work’ means turning the burden of proof
around. Communi-
ties would no
longer have to
‘prove their willing-
ness to substitute’,
but the govern-
ment and the inter-
national communi-
ty would have to
‘prove the viability
of alternatives’
before demanding
that peasant and
indigenous com-
munities place the
fragile foundations
of their survival
economy at risk.
The latest GTZ policy document Drugs and
Development in Latin America also recommends
non-conditionality as a guideline for future AD
strategy: “Ideally, reduction should be voluntary or,
in the second-best case, should be market induced,
i.e. a response to falling prices or a change in
demand.”
Harm Reduction for the 
Production Side
The proposed de-linking of AD from the
repressive dimensions of drug control can be
guided by introducing Harm Reduction con-
cepts into the supply-side drugs policy debate.
On the consumption side, the Harm Reduction
concept has spread very fast in recent years
and has now become the basis for a rational
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T h e  F a i l e d  B a l a n c e  i n  t h e  A n d e a n  R e g i o n
Communities would no longer
have to ‘prove their willingness
to substitute’, but the
government and the
international community
would have to ‘prove the
viability of alternatives’ before
demanding that peasant and
indigenous communities place
the fragile foundations of their
survival economy at risk.
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and pragmatic drug policy in almost every
European country and many others. Here, the
incompatibility with repressive approaches is
obvious and explicit. Forced detoxification,
incarceration for individual consumption, denial
of access to clean needles and the death penal-
ty are no longer considered to be ‘comple-
mentary policy instruments of a balanced and
comprehensive drug control policy’, of which
Harm Reduction programmes are ‘one of the
components.’ There are no attempts to deal
with the obvious contradictions by trying to
‘separate the instruments within the same pro-
ject area’. They are perceived as incompatible
tracks, where Harm Reduction explicitly
opposes indiscriminate repression. Harm
Reduction has thus not only become an effec-
tive instrument for reducing the harm caused
by drug misuse to consumers and society at
large but, in the drug policy debate, also chal-
lenges the War on Drugs mentality and the
‘zero option’ discourse. 
The time has come to apply this more ratio-
nal and pragmatic approach to the drugs pro-
duction side, in order to “[make] clear to every-
one that alternative development has nothing to
do with fumigation or eradication,” as GTZ direc-
tor Wolfgang Schmitt was quoted as saying
above. Introducing Harm Reduction concepts
to the supply-side, might encompass the fol-
lowing:
• Shifting away from the current obsession
with counting and reducing the numbers of
hectares, towards prioritising the policy goal
of reducing the harm associated with the
existence of illicit crops, including measures
to  reduce the harm done to the environ-
ment and attempts to reduce their impor-
tance in fuelling armed conflict.
• Opening up spaces for dialogue with involved
communities –free of deadline and ‘zero
option’ thinking– about their own problems
with drug-linked crops, allowing flexible grad-
ual reduction processes and other ways that
might reduce the harm of economic mono-
dependence or of problems related to local
abuse.
• Defining small growers more as economic
victims that have become ‘addicted’ to illic-
it crops for survival. Similarly to the Harm
Reduction approach to drug addicts, try to
provide conditions that allow them to come
out of it, but if that doesn’t work don’t
spray, incarcerate or kill them, but rather
assist them in a way that reduces the harm
to themselves and to society at large.
• Supporting the option of decriminalising
small illicit cultivation –a measure currently
being debated in Colombia’s Congress– sim-
ilar to the decriminalisation of individual
consumption or the possession of small
quantities for personal use.
• Exploring options of direct linkages between
Harm Reduction interventions on the sup-
ply and demand sides in order to stimulate
global debate. For example, in the frame-
work of an Alternative Development project,
raw opium from an indigenous community in
Colombia might be used to supply heroin
maintenance programmes in Switzerland and
the Netherlands.
• ‘De-demonising’ certain aspects of illicit
drugs, by differentiating more between spe-
cific substances and their potential harms and
benefits on the basis of scientific studies and
thus, for example, allowing exports of coca
products to international markets.
An Open Debate
Finally, what we urgently need is the creation
of political space to conduct an open and hon-
est debate: a re-assessment of the costs and
benefits of the current drug policy framework
and a critical examination of other potential
market-regulating models, with the freedom to
challenge the wisdom of the UN Conventions
and to allow experiments, in practice, with
other approaches. The mid-term review of the
UNGASS outcomes, which is scheduled for
2003, would provide a good opportunity for
such a global reflection. 
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Coca Crops in the Andean Region
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Coca production in Peru declined drastically, drop-
ping from a high of 129,100 hectares in 1992 to
34,200 in 2000. The decline was accredited to the ‘Air
Bridge Denial’ strategy of disrupting the aerial trans-
port of coca paste from Peru to processing facilities
in Colombia. The shoot-down policy against traf-
ficking aircraft led to a surplus of coca paste in Peru,
which supposedly brought about a price crash.
UNDCP then incorporated Peru into its list of ‘suc-
cess stories’, attributing success to the ‘balanced
approach’ of combining Alternative Development
(AD) with law enforcement.
Peru never legally banned –only tried to regulate–
coca cultivation, protecting substantial traditional
and harmless coca consumption. Forced manual
eradication was undertaken only between 1983 and
1989, at an average of 2,600 hectares per year. The
tensions this created resulted in a strengthening of
guerrilla forces, which forced the government to
reconsider the policy. Since then, only sporadic erad-
ication has occurred –primarily to soothe the US
annual certification process– triggering fierce
protests from peasant unions. Overall, Peruvian
efforts were largely focused on AD ‘without a stick’.
In 1981, USAID initiated a first crop substitution pro-
ject in the Alto Huallaga Valley, where most coca was
grown. In 1985 the UN became involved in AD pro-
grammes, and other donors joined the effort later.
Some $190 million were invested between 1987 and
1996 failing, however, to disturb cultivation nation-
wide. 
Neither AD, eradication, nor the Air Bridge inter-
diction convincingly explain the Peruvian coca-
crash. It was caused by structural changes in region-
al drug trafficking patterns in response to law
enforcement pressure in Colombia, combined with
intensification of armed conflicts in Peru and
Colombia, and reinforced by a natural disaster. First
there was the crackdown of the Medellin Cartel,
which had an immediate impact on coca prices due
to Peru’s dependence on Colombian buyers. Coca
prices in the Alto Huallaga plummeted from the
record high in 1987 of $4.52 per kg coca leaf and
$2,000 per kg coca paste, to $0.76 and $390 by 1990.
Intensification of the war against the Shining Path
and an outbreak of the Fusarium Oxysporum fun-
gus in 1992-1993 halved coca harvest in the Alto
Huallaga from 61,000 ha in 1992 to 28,900 in 1994.
Prices slowly recovered by the end of 1994. Then,
towards September 1995 coca leaf prices in the Hual-
laga fell again from $3 per kg to $0.40, and coca paste
from $850 per kg to $100. This second crash coin-
cided with the dismantling of the Cali Cartel into
many smaller local groups and the intensification of
the armed conflict in Colombia, causing a coca
boom there. Both price crashes increased the odds
for successful implementation of AD projects. AD
offered farmers an alternative livelihood strategy at
a time when they were having to abandon coca
plots anyway due to the price crash. Interdiction
strengthened the downward trend, prompting
emerging trafficking groups in Colombia to secure
their supply closer to home.
Peru is often referred to as proof of how law enforce-
ment contributes to improved conditions for AD,
arguing the need for a ‘balanced approach’. Law
enforcement operations were indeed among the
factors that caused the price crash, but these were
the interventions directed at specific drug cartels in
Colombia and not the Peruvian interdiction pro-
gramme. Law enforcement at other levels has oppo-
site effects. For example, increased interception of
the refined end products increases the demand for
raw materials and increases prices. The main impact
of the current high cocaine seizures, estimated at 30-
40% of cocaine production, should have been a
decrease in availability on the consumption market
but instead resulted in an increase in production.
Like seizures, eradication increases the price of raw
materials and therefore in economic terms impacts
negatively on conditions for AD projects.
The new government wants to avoid eradication,
restore social stability and good relations with peas-
ant unions, and increase AD investments, while
hoping to bolster price-induced voluntary aban-
donment of coca fields by weakening trafficking
groups through focused law enforcement. Latest
trends in Peru, however, indicate a recovery of prices
(3,50 p/kg. coca), an increase of coca cultivation
(50,000 has.), emerging opium poppy cultivation
(1,000 has.) and the consolidation of independent
Peruvian processing and trafficking groups with
their own international routes. The upsurge of fumi-
gations in Southern Colombia and the suppression
of illegal coca by military force in Bolivia may result
in a balloon effect, moving coca production back to
Peru. The question is how long Peru will be consid-
ered a success story of international drug control.
Peru: a success story?
12 D r u g s  a n d  C o n f l i c t  n o  4  -  M a r c h  2 0 0 2
nstigated by peasants and indigenous peo-
ples from the Lower Putumayo and local
authorities, the municipalities in the Ama-
zon region bordering Ecuador proposed
to Colombia’s central government the suspen-
sion of aerial fumigation in exchange for com-
mitments to manually eradicate coca crops.
This initiative, led by the municipality of Puer-
to Asís, came after many protests against fumi-
gation, including the cocalero marches of 1996.
The central government accepted this demand
towards mid-2001, but limited it to Puerto
Asís. Meanwhile, intensive fumigation continued
throughout the rest of the Lower Putumayo, as
did the dirty war in which many people died vio-
lently in selective massacres at the hands of
paramilitary forces. Months earlier, the guerril-
la had responded to paramilitary advances with
an armed sealing of the area, paralysing the
whole region. The siege, which had harsh socio-
economic consequences for the inhabitants and
created massive resentment in the region, ended
in failure.
The manual eradication proposal of Puerto Asís
made its way to Bogota stressing the need to
implement a gradual process of crop substitu-
tion, strengthen medium and long-term pro-
ductive projects, and provide technical assis-
tance and training for the peasants. In Bogota,
the proposal was approved under new condi-
tions reflecting the previous failed policy of
measuring results by the number of hectares
eradicated and the speed with which this took
place. 
The government imposed two conditions on the
cultivators: a deadline of one year to eradicate
all the coca contemplated under the various
pacts or face the threat of renewed fumigation;
and implementation of the various pacts under
conditions which subverted the notion of sus-
tainable development originally advocated by the
communities. 
Near-Sighted Goals
The government focused on meeting the imme-
diate food sufficiency needs of the families sign-
ing the pacts, offering to allocate 2 million pesos
(US$ 900) of livestock to each family. Delivery
of the farm goods was subcontracted to NGOs,
including private enterprises masquerading as
NGOs.1 This is where the first set of problems
with the pact originates.
1. The proposal to carry out a disciplined and
in-depth study of the region’s biophysical poten-
tial and the quality of its soil, also making a tech-
nical appraisal of the agricultural and environ-
mental potential of each sub-region, was disre-
garded. Likewise, estimating the capacity of the
area contemplated in the programme to sup-
port the current population (a capacity previ-
ously distorted by the coca economy), in order
to allocate the resources available more effi-
ciently, was also ignored. In short, the whole
effort of identifying zones in which investment
at a social and economic level could be max-
imised was abandoned.
2. Granting top priority to coca eradication in
the shortest time possible, the urge has been
simply to define the date by which manual erad-
ication would begin and thus safeguard the
application of the chief indicator in the current
anti-drugs policy. This has hindered the creation
of a socio-cultural identity and the building of
trust between state and communities, aggra-
vated by the lack of state commitment to longer-
term processes of sustainable, integral devel-
opment.
3. The original idea of the communities and the
local authorities was a gradual substitution
process, prioritising the development of medi-
um and long-term productive projects; attain-
ing immediate food security was a secondary
goal. With the central government’s focus on
short-term eradication, meeting the immediate
food sufficiency needs of peasants was consid-
ered more important than creating conditions
for sustainable long-term agricultural alterna-
tives, so that no immediate excuse for halting
coca production existed. The interpretation of
‘food security’ applied by the national institu-
tions responsible for drafting regional develop-
ment policies has led to food security being
viewed as a simple ‘delivery service’.2
This short-term approach and the lack of an
integral, sustainable development perspective
personalises the relationship between state and
family, fostering conflicts on that level and
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encouraging a culture of patronage. It also
increases the risk of using the benefits of such
pacts non-productively, such as converting state
granted farm goods into cash or consumer
goods, instead of into productive investments.3
This is why the communities had proposed the
need to tackle food self-sufficiency as part of
communal approaches.
4. Not even delivery, however, was successful.
By February 2002, 37.000 families had signed
agreements in the Putumayo Department, 6.000
of them from the municipality of Puerto Asís.
Only 1.800 of the latter had received the food
security package by this date, that is, 4.86% of
the total number of families involved and only
30% of the chosen pilot municipality (Puerto
Asís). The first agreements were signed in
December 2000, which means that the delivery
of the farm goods even to this tiny minority took
14 months.
5. The state’s food policy is rendered all the
more inconsistent through the lack of security
that the permanent threat of fumigation caus-
es, and through the severe effects of aerial
spraying by anti-narcotics authorities. They
often also spray pastures where the cattle to be
delivered by the state grazes.4 Obviously this
sends conflicting signals to the communities. 
A Non-Viable Strategy
The government has implemented no significant
economic and social reforms favouring the
poorest rural sector and also has done little to
build the capacity of state institutions in regions
such as the Putumayo. Herein lies the main frus-
tration of the communities and this constitutes
the greatest factor of distrust in central gov-
ernment. 
Productive projects have not been part of the
‘alternative development’ process, beyond some
isolated instances, such as the completion of a
palm heart processing plant, a white elephant of
the former Samper administration, built at a
much higher cost than originally envisaged. With
its capacity to process 1300 hectares, it might
benefit 650 families, estimating an average of two
hectares per family. This is 1.75% of the total
number of families entering into the agreements.
The state has forced signatories to the pacts to
go through the whole rigmarole of accepting the
delivery of the ill-defined food self-sufficiency
components, without accepting any responsi-
bility regarding the more substantial problems
hindering development. The poultry and two
cows per family were received as intended for
immediate consumption, rather than being seen
as part of any integral development vision.
Meanwhile, requests for technical assistance
and training for the peasants, part of the origi-
nal conditions, remain unanswered. 
Within the framework of the various pacts, land
entitlement can be regarded as the only condi-
tion that the central government has fully hon-
oured. Complementary projects in the areas of
infrastructure and services were partially com-
pleted, with special attention being paid to road
construction. Efforts in the areas of social health
and education, however, are notably weak. Such
an absence of full productive alternatives to
planting coca does not make its eradication
viable. To imagine that peasants would eradicate
their main source of livelihood in exchange for
the one-time delivery of 900 dollars in kind is
absurd.
In the absence of any viable government strat-
egy and, indeed, local capacity to address the
need for rural reforms within a war context and
a renewed crisis in the peace process (to which
the guerrilla has contributed by redoubling
attacks against the economic and services infra-
structure), the US government is stepping into
the vacuum.
US Pressure
High US State Department officials and the US
Embassy in Bogota are calling for an intensifi-
cation of aerial spraying to render impossible the
replanting of the 150.000 hectares of illicit crops
targeted. There is a vast expanse of 400.000
square kilometres in the Amazon-Orinoco Basin
where new coca plantations might be installed
to make up for the losses caused by cocaine
seizures and forced eradication. The environ-
mental damage that both fumigation and replant-
ing would unleash could not be worse for
Colombia. Meanwhile, USAID, through the
Chemonics firm, has demanded that the pro-
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ductive projects the community wants to nego-
tiate be tied to the total and immediate eradi-
cation of the illicit crops –that is, without any
extension of deadlines or any other conditions
outside the ‘zero coca’ scenario.
These two demands from the US are beginning
to sketch a dramatic future for the region. They
come at a time when the Colombian state finds
itself bankrupt as far as alternative development
policy is concerned. Policy guidelines are in
short supply and new entities have been creat-
ed, parallel to the discredited governmental
Plante Programme, that often act as conveyor
belts for the transmission of patronage relations
and political favours for private gain. They also
take place at a time that the peace process has
collapsed bolstered by a swing in public opin-
ion towards finding a solution through the use
of force. This is articulated in relation to the
‘war on terrorism’ currently being promoted by
Washington.
In this panorama of confusion and desolation for
the inhabitants of lower Putumayo, the Town
Hall of Puerto Asís is convinced of the need to
send Washington a clear signal, accepting to
eradicate coca without delay, so that it can show
a substantial area free of illicit crops. This is a
desperate measure taken in response to the
impending threat of aerial fumigation bound to
destroy anything green in its path, except the
armed groups in green uniforms bent on wag-
ing their war without any regard for the civil
population.
The central government continues to distance
itself from determining the region’s future,
allowing the pilot pact process to crumble to
pieces, its victims being the local communities
and the local authorities. Even the mediocre
administration in the Governor’s Office,
entrenched in Mocoa, capital of the Putumayo,
and characterised by patronage relations and
petty politics during this electoral year, shows
no sign of involvement in the unfolding drama
endured by the population dependent on illicit
crops. In spite of many mistakes, Puerto Asís has
a striking achievement to show for its troubles:
the truth is that it managed to put a halt to aer-
ial spraying for 15 months. Now it is demand-
ing international monitoring from European
countries, to verify who is accountable for not
fulfilling the pacts: a centralist government that
disempowers rather than strengthens local
dynamics, or a community that has proven to
possess more ingenious strategies for handling
the problem than they were given credit for. 
Between the two sides, the hawks of the US
State and Defence Departments hover, intent
on doing the only thing they know how to do:
fumigate, militarize the coca regions and fumi-
gate again, now under the guise of combating
terrorist finances. In this manner, they deny the
peasants’ social and economic rights and dismiss
as ungrounded the claims that aerial spraying has
negative impacts on health and the environment.
In the meantime, Colombia’s drug traffickers,
grouped into hundreds of organisations, con-
tinue to enjoy a period of peace and illegal pros-
perity in the cities. Thanks to Plan Colombia,
the problem is with the ‘terrorists’ and not with
these ‘respectable’ men, their legalised cover-
age and their tremendous political clout. 
No matter if the peasants are fumigated while
the drug traffickers finance the successful model
of Colombia’s dirty war and do all in their
power to control the outcome of the 2002 par-
liamentary elections. No matter if coca is erad-
icated but the drug barons legitimate their cap-
ital, safely stashed abroad until the whole prob-
lem of ‘internal security’ is resolved. Let them
fumigate, like they are already doing over the
rest of the Putumayo, including its population. 
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1 There is strong suspicion that some contracts with these so-
called NGOs are political paybacks to those who financed Pre-
sident Pastrana’s successful 1998 campaign.
2 This term was coined by workshop participants evaluating the
Puerto Asís pacts on February 8 and 9 2002, which was atten-
ded by local authorities and community representatives. The res-
ponsibility for the policy falls, in the first place, upon the Plante
Programme and, in the second place, upon the Ministries of Agri-
culture and Environment.
3 Examples of non-productive use of food self-sufficiency provi-
sions include exchange for alcoholic beverages, sales at half the
market price or simple disappearance, as in the case of chickens.
4 Due to the overall fumigation of these pastures, cattle owners
are forced to take their animals elsewhere, thus augmenting the
economic chaos and social uncertainty, both factors serving to
destroy what the state is purportedly constructing, that is, a licit
alternative economy.
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USEFUL WEBSITES
www.cepes.org.pe/alternativo/proyecto.htm
Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales (CEPES). Excellent site
on Alternative Development with regular updates on cultiva-
tion, statistics, bibliography on the issue, online documents,
Peruvian legislation and links (in Spanish). 
www.cicad.oas.org/en/
Alternativedevelopment/main.htm
Special section of the OAS’s Inter-American Drug Abuse Con-
trol Commission (CICAD) on alternative development. 
www.undcp.org/alternative_development.html
UNDCP website on alternative development, with a database
including all past and ongoing UNDCP alternative development
projects and a list of publications and links to other websites. 
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www.alternative-development.net 
Official Website of the International Conference on The Role
of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Develop-
ment Cooperation, 7-12 January 2002, Feldafing / Munich,
Germany. Information on the conference, the official con-
ference documents – The Feldafing Declaration and the Con-
clusions and Recommendations of the Conference – keynote
speeches and papers presented at the regional Asia and
Andean Region workshops and at the plenary sessions of the
conference –we recommend the papers from Martin Jelsma,
David Mansfield, Francisco Thoumi and Rita Gebert– and the
conclusions of the working groups. Also available are an
online forum and a list of non-official documents by some
participants to feed the discussion.
Alternative Development programmes, aimed at
encouraging peasants to switch from growing
illicit drugs-related crops, are a good idea. The
record of success, however, is a sorry one.
Decades of efforts to reduce global drug supply
using a mix of developmental and repressive
means, have failed.
This Drugs & Conflict debate paper elucidates the
analysis TNI contributed to a high-level
international policy conference to evaluate 25
years of Alternative Development, convened by
the German government and the United Nations
Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) in January
2002. 
TNI argues for a reconceptualisation of the
strategy – delinking alternative development from
the threat of forced eradication and law
enforcement, and guaranteeing peasants the
support required for a sustainable alternative
future.  Furthermore, our experts urge the
application of the concept of Harm Reduction as
the basis for a rational and pragmatic drug policy.
This concept has been applied successfully in
many countries, especially in Europe, but till now
only on the consumption side of the story. The
authors of this booklet argue it is high time that
Harm Reduction principles be applied to the
production side of the equation.
A significant breakthrough was achieved at the
German conference, with the final declaration
stating, “Alternative Development should neither be
made conditional on prior elimination of drug crop
cultivation nor should a reduction be enforced until licit
components of livelihood strategies have been
sufficiently strengthened.” While there is still a long
way to go in achieving just and effective drugs
policies, this does represent an important shift
away from the crude ‘carrot and stick’ approach
to peasant producers, which has so undermined
alternative development efforts to date.
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The Transnational Institute
(TNI) is a decentralized fellow-
ship of scholars, researchers and
writers from the South, Europe
and the U.S. committed to cre-
ate and promote international
co-operation in analysing and
finding possible solutions to such
global problems as militarism
and conflict, poverty and mar-
ginalisation, social injustice and
environmental degradation.
Since 1996, the TNI Drugs &
Democracy programme has
been analysing trends in the ille-
gal drugs economy and in drug
policies globally, their causes and
their effects on economy, peace
and democracy. 
The Drugs & Democracy pro-
gramme conducts field investi-
gations, engages policy debates,
briefs journalists and officials,
coordinates international cam-
paigns and conferences, pro-
duces articles, publications and
briefing documents, and main-
tains a daily electronic news ser-
vice on drugs-related issues. 
The aim of the project and of
the Drugs and Conflict series is
to stimulate a re-assessment of
conventional prohibitive and
repressive policy approaches and
to argue for policies based on
principles consistent with a com-
mitment to harm reduction, fair
trade, development, democra-
cy, human rights, environmental
and health protection, and con-
flict prevention. 
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